yazik.info Tutorials Philosophy In The Flesh Pdf


Saturday, August 3, 2019

George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. The mind is inherently embodied. on metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson ), which in Part II of this book they extend to. Michael O'Donovan-Anderson The Review of Metaphysics, June Lakoff, George and Johnson, Mark. Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its . Book Reviews Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (University of California.

Philosophy In The Flesh Pdf

Language:English, Spanish, Arabic
Genre:Business & Career
Published (Last):06.06.2015
ePub File Size:27.39 MB
PDF File Size:10.61 MB
Distribution:Free* [*Register to download]
Uploaded by: MARSHA

His new book Philosophy In The Flesh, coauthored by Mark Johnson, makes the science of the mind are inconsistent with central parts of Western philosophy. Philosophy in The yazik.info - Ebook download as PDF File .pdf), Text File .txt) or read book online. Philosophy in the Flesh. The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought. By GEORGE LAKOFF and MARK JOHNSON. Basic Books.

The mind is not merely embodied, but embodied in such a way that our conceptual systems draw largely upon the commonalities of our bodies and of the environments we live in. The result is that much of a person's conceptual system is either universal or widespread across languages and cultures. Our conceptual systems are not totally relative and not merely a matter of historical contingency, even though a degree of conceptual relativity does exist and even though historical contingency does matter a great deal.

The grounding of our conceptual systems in shared embodiment and bodily experience creates a largely centered self, but not a monolithic self. There exists no Fregean person-as posed by analytic philosophy-for whom thought has been extruded from the body. That is, there is no real person whose embodiment plays no role in meaning, whose meaning is purely objective and defined by the external world, and whose language can fit the external world with no significant role played by mind, brain, or body.

Because our conceptual systems grow out of our bodies, meaning is grounded in and through our bodies. Because a vast range of our concepts are metaphorical, meaning is not entirely literal and the classical correspondence theory of truth is false.

The correspondence theory holds that statements are true or false objectively, depending on how they map directly onto the worldindependent of any human understanding of either the statement or the world. On the contrary, truth is mediated by embodied understanding and imagination. That does not mean that truth is purely subjective or that there is no stable truth. Rather, our common embodiment allows for common, stable truths. There is no such thing as a computational person, whose mind is like computer software, able to work on any suitable computer or neural hardwarewhose mind somehow derives meaning from taking meaningless symbols as input, manipulating them by rule, and giving meaningless symbols as output.

Real people have embodied minds whose conceptual systems arise from, are shaped by, and are given meaning through living human bodies. The neural structures of our brains produce conceptual systems and linguistic structures that cannot be adequately accounted for by formal systems that only manipulate symbols.

Finally, there is no Chomskyan person, for whom language is pure syntax, pure form insulated from and independent of all meaning, context, perception, emotion, memory, attention, action, and the dynamic nature of communication.

Moreover, human language is not a totally genetic innovation. Rather, central aspects of language arise evolutionarily from sensory, motor, and other neural systems that are present in "lower" animals. Classical philosophical conceptions of the person have stirred our imaginations and taught us a great deal. But once we understand the importance of the cognitive unconscious, the embodiment of mind, and metaphorical thought, we can never go back to a priori philosophizing about mind and language or to philosophical ideas of what a person is that are inconsistent with what we are learning about the mind.

Given our new understanding of the mind, the question of what a human being is arises for us anew in the most urgent way. Asking Philosophical Questions Requires Using Human Reason If we are going to ask philosophical questions, we have to remember that we are human. As human beings, we have no special access to any form of purely objective or transcendent reason. We must necessarily use common human cognitive and neural mechanisms.

Because most of our thought is unconscious, a priori philosophizing provides no privileged direct access to knowledge of our own mind and how our experience is constituted. In asking philosophical questions, we use a reason shaped by the body, a cognitive unconscious to which we have no direct access, and metaphorical thought of which we are largely unaware. The fact that abstract thought is mostly metaphorical means that answers to philosophical questions have always been, and always will be, mostly metaphorical.

In itself, that is neither good nor bad. It is simply a fact about the capacities of the human mind. But it has major consequences for every aspect of philosophy. Metaphorical thought is the principal tool that makes philosophical insight possible and that constrains the forms that philosophy can take.

Philosophical reflection, uninformed by cognitive science, did not discover, establish, and investigate the details of the fundamental aspects of mind we will be discussing.

Some insightful philosophers did notice some of these phenomena, but lacked the empirical methodology to establish the validity of these results and to study them in fine detail. Without empirical confirmation, these facts about the mind did not find their way into the philosophical mainstream. Jointly, the cognitive unconscious, the embodiment of mind, and metaphorical thought require not only a new way of understanding reason and the nature of a person.

They also require a new understanding of one of the most common and natural of human activities-asking philosophical questions. If you're going to reopen basic philosophical issues, here's the minimum you have to do. First, you need a method of investigation.

Second, you have to use that method to understand basic philosophical concepts. Third, you have to apply that method to previous philosophies to understand what they are about and what makes them hang together. And fourth, you have to use that method to ask the big questions: What it is to be a person?

What is morality? How do we understand the causal structure of the universe? And so on.

This book takes a small first step in each of these areas, with the intent of giving an overview of the enterprise of rethinking what philosophy can become. The methods we use come from cognitive science and cognitive linguistics.

Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought

We discuss these methods in Part I of the book. In Part II, we study the cognitive science of basic philosophical ideas. That is, we use these methods to analyze certain basic concepts that any approach to philosophy must address, such as time, events, causation, the mind, the self, and morality. In Part III, we begin the study of philosophy itself from the perspective of cognitive science. We apply these analytic methods to important moments in the history of philosophy: Greek metaphysics, including the pre-Socratics, Plato, and Aristotle; Descartes's theory of mind and Enlightenment faculty psychology; Kant's moral theory; and analytic philosophy.

These methods, we argue, lead to new and deep insights into these great intellectual edifices. They help us understand those philosophies and explain why, despite their fundamental differences, they have each seemed intuitive to many people over the centuries. We also take up issues in contemporary philosophy, linguistics, and the social sciences, in particular, Anglo-American analytic philosophy, Chomskyan linguistics, and the rational-actor model used in economics and foreign policy.

Finally, in Part IV , we summarize what we have learned in the course of this inquiry about what human beings are and about the human condition. What emerges is a philosophy close to the hone. A philosophical perspective based on our empirical understanding of the embodiment of mind is a philosophy in the flesh, a philosophy that takes account of what we most basically are and can be.

The Cognitive Unconscious iving a human life is a philosophical endeavor. Every thought we have, every decision we make, and every act we perform is based upon philosophical assumptions so numerous we couldn't possibly list them all.

We go around armed with a host of presuppositions about what is real, what counts as knowledge, how the mind works, who we are, and how we should act. Such questions, which arise out of our daily concerns, form the basic subject matter of philosophy: metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, ethics, and so on. Metaphysics, for example, is a fancy name for our concern with what is real.

Traditional metaphysics asks questions that sound esoteric: What is essence? What is causation? What is time?

What is the self? But in everyday terms there is nothing esoteric about such questions. Take our concern with morality. Does morality consist of a set of absolute moral laws that come from universal reason?

Or is it a cultural construct? Or neither? Are there unchanging universal moral values? Where does morality come from? Is it part of the essence of what it is to be a human being? Is there an essence of what it is to be a human being? And what, exactly, is an essence anyway? Causation might appear to be another esoteric topic that only a philosopher could care about. But our moral and political commitments and actions presuppose implicit views on whether there are social causes and, if so, what they might be.

Whenever we attribute moral or social responsibility, we are implicitly assuming the possibility of causation, as well as very specific notions of what a cause is. Or take the self. Asking about the nature of the self might seem to be the ultimate in esoteric metaphysical speculation.

But we cannot get through a day without relying on unconscious conceptions of the internal structure of the self. Have you taken a good look at yourself recently?

Are you trying to find your "true self"? Are you in control of yourself? Do you have a hidden self that you are trying to protect or that is so awful you don't want anyone to know about it? If you have ever considered any matters of this sort, you have been relying on unconscious models of what a self is, and you could hardly live a life of any introspection at all without doing so.

Though we are only occasionally aware of it, we are all metaphysicians-not in some ivorytower sense but as part of our everyday capacity to make sense of our experience. It is through our conceptual systems that we are able to make sense of everyday life, and our everyday metaphysics is embodied in those conceptual systems. The Cognitive Unconscious Cognitive science is the scientific discipline that studies conceptual systems. It is a relatively new discipline, having been founded in the s.

Yet in a short time it has made startling discoveries. It has discovered, first of all, that most of our thought is unconscious, not in the Freudian sense of being repressed, but in the sense that it operates beneath the level of cognitive awareness, inaccessible to consciousness and operating too quickly to be focused on. Consider, for example, all that is going on below the level of conscious awareness when you are in a conversation.

It is not merely that we occasionally do not notice these processes; rather, they are inaccessible to conscious awareness and control. When we understand all that constitutes the cognitive unconscious, our understanding of the nature of consciousness is vastly enlarged. Consciousness goes way beyond mere awareness of something, beyond the mere experience of qualia the qualitative senses of, for example, pain or color , beyond the awareness that you are aware, and beyond the multiple takes on immediate experience provided by various centers of the brain.

Consciousness certainly involves all of the above plus the immeasurably vaster constitutive framework provided by the cognitive unconscious, which must be operating for us to be aware of anything at all.

Log in to Wiley Online Library

Why "Cognitive" Unconscious? The term cognitive has two very different meanings, which can sometimes create confusion. In cognitive science, the term cognitive is used for any kind of mental operation or structure that can be studied in precise terms. Most of these structures and operations have been found to be unconscious. Thus, visual processing falls under the cognitive, as does auditory processing. Obviously, neither of these is conscious, since we are not and could not possibly be aware of each of the neural processes involved in the vastly complicated total process that gives rise to conscious visual and auditory experience.

Memory and attention fall under the cognitive. All aspects of thought and language, conscious or unconscious, are thus cognitive. This includes phonology, grammar, conceptual systems, the mental lexicon, and all unconscious inferences of any sort. Mental imagery, emotions, and the conception of motor operations have also been studied from such a cognitive perspective.

And neural modeling of any cognitive operation is also part of cognitive science. Confusion sometimes arises because the term cognitive is often used in a very different way in certain philosophical traditions.

For philosophers in these traditions, cognitive means only conceptual or propositional structure. It also includes rule-governed operations on such conceptual and propositional structures.

Moreover, cognitive meaning is seen as truthconditional meaning, that is, meaning defined not internally in the mind or body, but by reference to things in the external world.

Most of what we will be calling the cognitive unconscious is thus for many philosophers not considered cognitive at all. As is the practice in cognitive science, we will use the term cognitive in the richest possible sense, to describe any mental operations and structures that are involved in language, meaning, perception, conceptual systems, and reason.

Because our conceptual systems and our reason arise from our bodies, we will also use the term cognitive for aspects of our sensorimotor system that contribute to our abilities to conceptualize and to reason.

Since cognitive operations are largely unconscious, the term cognitive unconscious accurately describes all unconscious mental operations concerned with conceptual systems, meaning, inference, and language.

The Hidden Hand That Shapes Conscious Thought The very existence of the cognitive unconscious, a fact fundamental to all conceptions of cognitive science, has important implications for the practice of philosophy. It means that we can have no direct conscious awareness of most of what goes on in our minds. The idea that pure philosophical reflection can plumb the depths of human understanding is an illusion.

Traditional methods of philosophical analysis alone, even phenomenological introspection, cannot come close to allowing us to know our own minds.

There is much to be said for traditional philosophical reflection and phenomenological analysis. They can make us aware of many aspects of consciousness and, to a limited extent, can enlarge our capacities for conscious awareness. Phenomenological reflection even allows us to examine many of the background prereflective structures that lie beneath our conscious experience. But neither method can adequately explore the cognitive unconscious-the realm of thought that is completely and irrevocably inaccessible to direct conscious introspection.

It is this realm that is the primary focus of cognitive science, which allows us to theorize about the cognitive unconscious on the basis of evidence. Cognitive science, however, does not allow us direct access to what the cognitive unconscious is doing as it is doing it.

Conscious thought is the tip of an enormous iceberg. It is the rule of thumb among cognitive scientists that unconscious thought is 95 percent of all thought-and that may be a serious underestimate. Moreover, the 95 percent below the surface of conscious awareness shapes and structures all conscious thought. If the cognitive unconscious were not there doing this shaping, there could be no conscious thought. The cognitive unconscious is vast and intricately structured.

It includes not only all our automatic cognitive operations, but also all our implicit knowledge. All of our knowledge and beliefs are framed in terms of a conceptual system that resides mostly in the cognitive unconscious. Our unconscious conceptual system functions like a "hidden hand" that shapes how we conceptualize all aspects of our experience.

This hidden hand gives form to the metaphysics that is built into our ordinary conceptual systems. It creates the entities that inhabit the cognitive unconscious-abstract entities like friendships, bargains, failures, and lies-that we use in ordinary unconscious reasoning.

It thus shapes how we automatically and unconsciously comprehend what we experience. It constitutes our unreflective common sense. For example, let us return to our commonsense understanding of the self. Consider the common experience of struggling to gain control over ourselves. We not only feel this struggle within us, but conceptualize the "struggle" as being between two distinct parts of our self, each with different values. Sometimes we think of our "higher" moral and rational self struggling to get control over our "lower" irrational and amoral self.

Our conception of the self, in such cases, is fundamentally metaphoric. We conceptualize ourselves as split into two distinct entities that can be at war, locked in a struggle for control over our bodily behavior.

This metaphoric conception is rooted deep in our unconscious conceptual systems, so much so that it takes considerable effort and insight to see how it functions as the basis for reasoning about ourselves.

Similarly, when you try to find your "true self," you are using another, usually unconscious metaphorical conceptualization. There are more than a dozen such metaphorical conceptions of the self, and we will discuss them below.

When we consciously reason about how to gain mastery over ourselves, or how to protect our vulnerable "inner self," or how to find our "true self," it is the hidden hand of the unconscious conceptual system that makes such reasoning "common sense.

We will discuss some of the most basic of philosophical concepts, not only the self but also time, events, causation, essence, the mind, and morality.

What is startling is that, even for these most basic of concepts, the hidden hand of the unconscious mind uses metaphor to define our unconscious metaphysics-the metaphysics used not just by ordinary people, but also by philosophers to make sense of these concepts. As we will see, what counts as an "intuitive" philosophical theory is one that draws upon these unconscious metaphors.

In short, philosophical theories are largely the product of the hidden hand of the cognitive unconscious. Throughout history it has been virtually impossible for philosophers to do metaphysics without such metaphors.

For the most part, philosophers engaged in making metaphysical claims are choosing from the cognitive unconscious a set of existing metaphors that have a consistent ontology.

Philosophy in The Flesh.pdf

That is, using unconscious everyday metaphors, philosophers seek to make a noncontradictory choice of conceptual entities defined by those metaphors; they then take those entities to be real and systematically draw out the implications of that choice in an attempt to account for our experience using that metaphysics. Metaphysics in philosophy is, of course, supposed to characterize what is real-literally real. The irony is that such a conception of the real depends upon unconscious metaphors.

Empirically Responsible Philosophy: Beyond Naturalized Epistemology For more than two thousand years, philosophy has defined metaphysics as the study of what is literally real. The weight of that tradition is so great that it is hardly likely to change in the face of empirical evidence against the tradition itself.

Nevertheless that evidence, which comes from cognitive science, exists and raises deep questions not only about the project of philosophical metaphysics but also about the nature of philosophy itself. Throughout most of our history, philosophy has seen itself as being independent of empirical investigation.

It is that aspect of philosophy that is called into question by results in cognitive science. Through the study of the cognitive unconscious, cognitive science has given us a radically new view of how we conceptualize our experience and how we think.

Cognitive science-the empirical study of the mind-calls upon us to create a new, empirically responsible philosophy, a philosophy consistent with empirical discoveries about the nature of mind. This is not just old-fashioned philosophy "naturalized"-making minor adjustments, but basically keeping the old philosophical superstructure.

A serious appreciation of cognitive science requires us to rethink philosophy from the beginning, in a way that would put it more in touch with the reality of how we think.

It would be based on a detailed understanding of the cognitive unconscious, the hidden hand that shapes our conscious thought, our moral values, our plans, and our actions. Unless we know our cognitive unconscious fully and intimately, we can neither know ourselves nor truly understand the basis of our moral judgments, our conscious deliberations, and our philosophy. The Embodied Mind chat does it mean to say that concepts and reason are embodied? This chapter takes a first step toward answering that question.

It takes up the role that the perceptual and motor systems play in shaping particular kinds of concepts: color concepts, basic-level concepts, spatial-relations concepts, and aspectual event-structuring concepts. Any reasoning you do using a concept requires that the neural structures of the brain carry out that reasoning. Accordingly, the architecture of your brain's neural networks determines what concepts you have and hence the kind of reasoning you can do. Neural modeling is the field that studies which configurations of neurons carry out the neural computations that we experience as particular forms of rational thought.

It also studies how such neural configurations are learned. Neural modeling can show in detail one aspect of what it means for the mind to be embodied: how particular configurations of neurons, operating according to principles of neural computation, compute what we experience as rational inferences.

At this point the vague question "Can reason make use of the sensorimotor system? Those cases will be discussed in this chapter. Flow the Body and Brain Shape Reason We have inherited from the Western philosophical tradition a theory of faculty psychology, in which we have a "faculty" of reason that is separate from and in dependent of what we do with our bodies. In particular, reason is seen as independent of perception and bodily movement.

In the Western tradition, this autonomous capacity of reason is regarded as what makes us essentially human, distinguishing us from all other animals. If reason were not autonomous, that is, not independent of perception, motion, emotion, and other bodily capacities, then the philosophical demarcation between us and all other animals would be less clearly drawn. This view was formulated prior to the emergence of evolutionary theory, which shows that human capacities grow out of animal capacities.

The evidence from cognitive science shows that classical faculty psychology is wrong. There is no such fully autonomous faculty of reason separate from and independent of bodily capacities such as perception and movement.

The evidence supports, instead, an evolutionary view, in which reason uses and grows out of such bodily capacities. The result is a radically different view of what reason is and therefore of what a human being is.

This chapter surveys some of the evidence for the view that reason is fundamentally embodied. These findings of cognitive science are profoundly disquieting in two respects. First, they tell us that human reason is a form of animal reason, a reason inextricably tied to our bodies and the peculiarities of our brains.

Second, these results tell us that our bodies, brains, and interactions with our environment provide the mostly unconscious basis for our everyday metaphysics, that is, our sense of what is real.

Cognitive science provides a new and important take on an age-old philosophical problem, the problem of what is real and how we can know it, if we can know it. Our sense of what is real begins with and depends crucially upon our bodies, especially our sensorimotor apparatus, which enables us to perceive, move, and manipulate, and the detailed structures of our brains, which have been shaped by both evolution and experience.

Neural Beings Must Categorize Every living being categorizes. Even the amoeba categorizes the things it encounters into food or nonfood, what it moves toward or moves away from. The amoeba cannot choose whether to categorize; it just does.

The same is true at every level of the animal world. Animals categorize food, predators, possible mates, members of their own species, and so on. How animals categorize depends upon their sensing apparatus and their ability to move themselves and to manipulate objects. Categorization is therefore a consequence of how we are embodied. We have evolved to categorize; if we hadn't, we would not have survived. Categorization is, for the most part, not a product of conscious reasoning.

We categorize as we do because we have the brains and bodies we have and because we interact in the world the way we do. The first and most important thing to realize about categorization is that it is an inescapable consequence of our biological makeup. We are neural beings. Our brains each have billion neurons and trillion synaptic connections.

It is common in the brain for information to be passed from one dense ensemble of neurons to another via a relatively sparse set of connections.

Whenever this happens, the pattern of activation distributed over the first set of neurons is too great to be represented in a one-to-one manner in the sparse set of connections. Therefore, the sparse set of connections necessarily groups together certain input patterns in mapping them across to the output ensemble. Whenever a neural ensemble provides the same output with different inputs, there is neural categorization.

To take a concrete example, each human eye has million light-sensing cells, but only about 1 million fibers leading to the brain. Each incoming image must therefore be reduced in complexity by a factor of That is, information in each fiber constitutes a "categorization" of the information from about cells. Neural categorization of this sort exists throughout the brain, up through the highest levels of categories that we can be aware of.

When we see trees, we see them as trees, not just as individual objects distinct from one another. The same with rocks, houses, windows, doors, and so on. A small percentage of our categories have been formed by conscious acts of categorization, but most are formed automatically and unconsciously as a result of functioning in the world. Though we learn new categories regularly, we cannot make massive changes in our category systems through conscious acts of recategorization though, through experience in the world, our categories are subject to unconscious reshaping and partial change.

We do not, and cannot, have full conscious control over how we categorize. Even when we think we are deliberately forming new categories, our unconscious categories enter into our choice of possible conscious categories. Most important, it is not just that our bodies and brains determine that we will categorize; they also determine what kinds of categories we will have and what their structure will be.

Think of the properties of the human body that contribute to the peculiarities of our conceptual system. We have eyes and ears, arms and legs that work in certain very definite ways and not in others. We have a visual system, with topographic maps and orientation-sensitive cells, that provides structure for our ability to conceptualize spatial relations.

Our abilities to move in the ways we do and to track the motion of other things give motion a major role in our conceptual system. The fact that we have muscles and use them to apply force in certain ways leads to the structure of our system of causal concepts.

What is important is not just that we have bodies and that thought is somehow embodied. What is important is that the peculiar nature of our bodies shapes our very possibilities for conceptualization and categorization.

Since we are neural beings, our categories are formed through our embodiment. What that means is that the categories we form are part of our experience! They are the structures that differentiate aspects of our experience into discernible kinds. Categorization is thus not a purely intellectual matter, occurring after the fact of experience. Rather, the formation and use of categories is the stuff of experience.

It is part of what our bodies and brains are constantly engaged in. We cannot, as some meditative traditions suggest, "get beyond" our categories and have a purely uncategorized and unconceptualized experience. Neural beings cannot do that. What we call concepts are neural structures that allow us to mentally characterize our categories and reason about them. Human categories are typically conceptualized in more than one way, in terms of what are called prototypes.

Each prototype is a neural structure that permits us to do some sort of inferential or imaginative task relative to a category. Typical-case prototypes are used in drawing inferences about category members in the absence of any special contextual information.

Ideal-case prototypes allow us to evaluate category members relative to some conceptual standard. To see the difference, compare the prototypes for the ideal husband and the typical husband. Social stereotypes are used to make snap judgments, usually about people. Salient exemplars well-known examples are used for making probability judgments. For a survey of kinds of conceptual prototypes, see A4, Lakoff In short, prototype-based reasoning constitutes a large proportion of the actual reasoning that we do.

Reasoning with prototypes is, indeed, so common that it is inconceivable that we could function for long without it. Since most categories are matters of degree e. Such graded norms are described by what are called linguistic hedges A4, Lakoff , for example, very, pretty, kind of, barely, and so on.

For the sake of imposing sharp distinctions, we develop what might be called essence prototypes, which conceptualize categories as if they were sharply defined and minimally distinguished from one another. When we conceptualize categories in this way, we often envision them using a spatial metaphor, as if they were containers, with an interior, an exterior, and a boundary.

When we conceptualize categories as containers, we also impose complex hierarchical systems on them, with some category-containers inside other category-containers. Conceptualizing categories as containers hides a great deal of category structure.

It hides conceptual prototypes, the graded structures of categories, and the fuzziness of category boundaries. Log In Sign Up. Michael Anderson. Lakoff, George and Johnson, Mark. Philosophy in the Flesh: New York: Basic Books, It begins by announcing three major "findings" of cognitive science: Thought is mostly unconscious.

Abstract concepts are largely metaphorical. The findings they detail are of extreme importance, the arguments in support of them are challenging, innovative, and largely convincing, and their willingness to explicate their implications is laudable.

But their explicit and oft-repeated expectation that the work of cognitive scientists will deeply change the practice of philosophy, "require our culture to abandon some of its deepest philosophical assumptions," p. The shortest, but finest part of the book is spent explaining and arguing for the three theses above. According to Lakoff and Johnson, the mind is inherently embodied not just because all its processes must, ex hypothesi, be neurally instantiated, but because perceptual and motor systems play a foundational role in concept definition and in rational inference.

Color concepts, for instance, are characterized by a "center-periphery" structure, with certain colors being "focal" and others conceptualized in terms of the focal hue. In the category "red" there is a central red, as well as peripheral hues tending toward the purple, pink, and orange. Focal hues correspond to frequencies of maximal neural response," with the peripheral structure being determined by the overall shape of the neural response curve.

Consider the concept of an altar: The proper way to approach an altar, and the sorts of behavior that are appropriate near and towards an altar, both define and demonstrate what it is. How this impacts rational inference is a bit harder to explain, but involves, at least partly, the thesis that abstract concepts are largely metaphorical—that certain domains of concepts "map onto" other domains, and in so doing inherit the inferential structure of the original domain.

For instance, the concept of a purpose maps onto the concept of a destination Purposes are Destinations and therefore reasoning about purposes naturally follows the same paths. We imagine a goal as being at some place ahead of us, and employ strategies for attaining it analogous to those we might use on a journey to a place. We plan a route, imagine obstacles, and set landmarks to track our progress.

In this way, our thinking about purposes and about time, and states, and change, and many other things besides is rooted in our thinking about space.

It should come as no surprise to anyone that our concepts of space—up, down, forward, back, on and in—are deeply tied to our bodily orientation to, and our physical movement in the world.If you're going to reopen basic philosophical issues. Because of these discoveries, philosophy can never be the same again. Our sense of what is real begins with and depends crucially upon our bodies. The range of cases covered by English on is instead described by using body-part projections.

Human categories are typically conceptualized in more than one way.

Berlin et at. The Hidden Hand That Shapes Conscious Thought The very existence of the cognitive unconscious, a fact fundamental to all conceptions of cognitive science, has important implications for the practice of philosophy.